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Last Words
On Becoming a Discipline
Mark Steedman∗
University of Edinburgh
The title of this column, Last Words, reminds me of an occasion in 2005, when I had the
privilege of attending the award ceremony for the prestigious Benjamin FranklinMedal,
given annually to a few scientists who have made outstanding lifetime contributions to
science. This time, a computational linguist, Aravind Joshi, was among them, so several
past, present, and future presidents and ofﬁcers of the ACL joined the Great and the
Good at the ceremony at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia.
The eight medal recipients were each represented by a short video presentation,
which mostly consisted of voice-over by a narrator, interspersed with sound-bites from
the recipients about their life and work, in the last of which they had clearly been asked
to deliver as their last words a brief take-home message.
I couldn’t help noticing that the warmest applause was reserved for the physicist, a
distinguished pioneer of string theory. I was initially puzzled by the enthusiasm on the
part of a mostly lay audience for such theoretical work, which for all its elegance and
beauty, could not (as far as I could see) be expected to have nearly as much impact on
their everyday lives as that of some of the other recipients, who that year included not
only Aravind, but another computer scientist whose impact on information processing
will be obvious to the members of ACL, Andrew Viterbi.
But then I recalled that the physicist’s take-home message had had nothing to do
with string theory. This admirable man’s last words to us had been the following:
Everything is made of particles. So physics is very important.
1. The Public Image of a Science
I realized then that what we were applauding was not a physicist, or the beauty of
string theory, but physics itself. I was reminded that physicists are looked on as public
intellectuals who can be relied on to deliver Truth, and who are generally assumed
to be doing A Good Job, even when they say that the universe must really be ten-
dimensional, except that exactly six of the dimensions are curled up so tightly that there
is no conceivable way of detecting them, nor any prospect of bringing to bear the huge
energies that would be required to straighten them out a bit so we could take a look at
them. (As many of you will know, I Am Not Making This Up.)
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How different this public image is from that of computational linguistics, or of
artiﬁcial intelligence, and even core computer science. To the extent that the public
thinks at all about what we do, they think of us as producing gadgets, such as amusing
new sorts of telephone. Only the other day, a colleague was called up by someone in a
neighboring department asking if we could mend his PC for him. (“Don’t you have a
Little Man? You used to have a Little Man.”)
As a result, computer science is continually subjected to governmental reviews
seeking assurance that we know what we are doing, and are doing enough for the
economy. Many of these reviews draw very negative conclusions—the 1966 report of
the Automatic Language Processing Advisory Committee (ALPAC) of the US National
Academy of Sciences effectively shut down research in machine translation for over
a decade, and was the main reason for ACL changing its name in 1968 from the As-
sociation for Machine Translation and Computational Linguistics (AMTCL). The 1973
report of Sir James Lighthill (a ﬂuid dynamicist known for his foundational work in the
ﬁeld of aeroacoustics) to the UK Science Research Council (SRC) closed down artiﬁcial
intelligence and NLP research for a decade, until the Alvey report decided that British
industry had fallen behind in this area, and opened it up again. There have been many
similar examples since then, though few as catastrophic.
Nobody goes around telling physicists what not to work on, or setting up commis-
sions chaired by complete outsiders (roboticists or computational linguists, perhaps?) to
decide whether physicists are earning their keep. The physicists tell the goverment what
they think it is right to do, and the government either funds it or it doesn’t. Even when
it doesn’t, as in the case of the superconducting supercollider, it’s because they can’t
afford it, or lack the political power, not because of low esteem. How do the physicists
do it?
Of course, as Duke Ellington said when asked how he kept his band together
through the Beatles’ era, you have to have a gimmick. The physicists gave us atomic
energy and the bomb, so no one can ever suggest again that they do not deliver Bang
for the Buck, even when they actually don’t, as may well turn out to be the case for the past
twenty years or so of research in string theory and supersymmetry.1
However, it is farmore important that physics consists of a body of great empirically
proven laws that all scientists recognize, from the laws of thermodynamics to the
special and general theories of relativity and quantum theory. This body of knowledge
lends both authority, and a breadth of vision that transcends any individual physicist’s
work and any individual theory, even if parts of it can be temporarily ignored when
convenient.
But we too have awesome devices. Search engines have arguably changed people’s
lives at least as profoundly as atomic energy. The statistical machine translation tools
that Google launched around May 2006 with Arabic for all the world to freely beta-
test, and which have since been extended to Chinese, Russian, Japanese, and Korean,
imperfect as they are, may well have an even bigger impact. Our colleagues in AI rejoice
in beating international chess Grand Masters with Deep Blue, and boast of robots on
Mars and autonomous vehicles charging around the Mojave desert. Computer science
has the Internet itself to show off.
We too have discovered great truths—Zipf’s Law, Information Theory, the power of
statistically approximate language models, the only-just-trans-context-free automata-
theoretic level of natural languages, the surface-compositionality of natural language
1 For a recent review of this question, see Smolin 2006.
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semantics, and have dreams of a grand uniﬁed head dependency-driven Theory of
Everything that that will one day make probabilistic and deterministic components
work together to yield Meaning. How come we don’t get respect?
The answer, I’m afraid, is that we haven’t yet managed to form ourselves into a dis-
cipline, within which those important truths are respected and held beyond reasonable
doubt, in whose name we stand united in the eyes of the world. Instead, our history has
been sectarian, with dominant factions seeking to suppress proposals that diverge too
much from the current orthodoxy, until they too are overthrown.
This tendency is very evident in computer science peer review of proposals to
funding agencies, which are notably harsher than in other sciences, and which have
the effect of making the agencies assume a shortage of good science in the ﬁeld, so that
they reduce funding accordingly. Worse still, when we have theoretical disagreements,
we play them out in public. (The split between connectionists and the rest of AI/NLP is
a case in point. It is sad to note that similar internal dissension seems to have played a
role in the adverse conclusions reached in both the ALPAC and Lighthill reports.)
The physicists don’t do this. When they review proposals, they rate them excel-
lent at around twice the rate in CS, even if it means not getting funded themselves
in the current round. The funding agencies conclude that there is a surplus of good
science there, and seek or allocate further funding for the next round. When there are
disagreements—as there seem to be currently about string theory—they are argued
out behind closed doors, until a consensus can be reached and be presented to the
general public. The biologists behaved similarly over a recent disagreement concerning
methods for sequencing the genome.
One measure of our own ﬁsiparous tendencies is that, while from the 1950s to the
1980s, the information theoreticians and statistical modelers among us used to make
common cause with the linguists, we have subsequently drifted apart. We have come to
believe that the linguists have forgotten Zipf’s law, which says that most of the variance
in language behavior can be captured by a small part of the system.
The linguists, on the other hand, think that it is we who have forgotten Zipf’s law,
which also says that most of the information about the language system as a whole is in the
Long Tail.
It is we who are at fault here, because the machine learning techniques that we rely
on are actually very bad at inducing systems for which the crucial information is in rare
events—like physics, for example.
There is a grave danger here for the future of our putative discipline. One day, either
because of the demise of Moore’s law, or simply because we have done all the easy stuff,
the Long Tail will come back to haunt us. For example, consider the current state of our
former nemesis MT.
2. Machine Translation Then and Now
Machine translation (MT) was one of the earliest applications envisaged for computing
machinery. Weaver (1949) identiﬁed the extreme ambiguity of natural language as the
central problem of MT, and outlined as possible solutions not only the “noisy channel”
model of SMT and its basis in n-gram language models, investigated with Claude Shan-
non (Shannon andWeaver 1949), but also the notion of parsing as logical deduction, and
the interlingua-based syntax-driven approach to MT, which he based on the linguists’
notion of Universal Grammar. (No sectarianism there, at least.)
It is interesting that, in that bright dawn, MT seemed likely to prove one of the
easier cognitive tasks to mimic by machine. There seemed to be a real possibility that
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there might be ways to bypass understanding altogether using simple purely syntactic
and probabilistic devices. Over the next few years, there was a gradual disillusion with
this expectation, for at least three reasons.
First, Chomsky (1957) showed beyond a reasonable doubt that natural languages
not only fell outside the class that could be completely recognized using ﬁnite-state
machines of the class implicit in Shannon’s models, but also fell outside the class that
could be adequately represented by context-free grammars. It wasn’t immediately clear
how to translate such grammars into computational terms, and they appeared to break
the unity of grammar and probabilistic model that had been one of the attractions of
the information-theoretic approach (although Chomsky was careful to acknowledge the
possibility of statistically approximating such grammars with Markov processes for the
purpose of reducing ambiguity).
Second, it became clear that the grammars that were needed for real texts, even
within narrow genres like newspaper text or scientiﬁc papers, were very large indeed.
The lack of computational transparency of grammar formalisms tended to give the
hand-built grammars of this period the character of unstructured programs, with no
apparent prospect of inducing them automatically.
Third, the problem of ambiguity for grammars of this size was much worse than
anyone had expected.
As a result, opinion changed, and MT became seen as one of the hardest cognitive
problems, requiring deep understanding of semantics and knowledge of the world, as
well as full syntactic processing.
There is an often-repeated story about these days (one which has all the hallmarks
of a myth) concerning a demonstration of an early Russian dictionary-based MT system
using back-translation from English to Russian and back again. According to legend,
the demonstrators were disconcerted to ﬁnd that the sentence Time ﬂies like an arrow
returned as Time ﬂies enjoy arrows, revealing a syntactic analysis of the sentence that
would have been appropriate for the sentence Fruit ﬂies like a banana.2
Of course we now know that the problem of the 1950s and 1960s was the lack
of language models, of a kind that is now commonplace, thanks to Moore’s law and
HMMs, together with a method for learning such models and integrating them with
structural rules. Some real progress has been made, and MT is once again thought of as
an “easy” problem, that can be at least partly solved with relatively low-level methods.
3. An Experiment
So, how much progress have we made? We can repeat the back-translation experi-
ment with Google Language Tools Beta n-gram-and-ﬁnite-state-transducer-based Ara-
bic SMT. (The ﬁrst line is the English input, the Arabic is its SMT translation, the third
line is a gloss of the Arabic words, and the last line is the result of translating the Arabic
back again by SMT.)
2 There are many variants of this apocryphal story, involving other examples, all of which are likely to
have their origin in much older jests about human dictionary-based translation (Hutchins 1995).
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On the basis of the result of the back-translation, this looks OK, give or take
a bit of morphology, but of course end-to-end back-translation is a very weak test,
where you can just get lucky. Readers of Arabic will notice that the translation of like
is indeed a comparative, not a verb meaning enjoy, as in the legend. However, they
will also notice that ﬂies translates as the noun, rather than the verb, just as the story
foretold.
If we try the same test on Fruit ﬂies like a banana, the ﬂies are still insects, but like is
still comparative, rather than a verb. So the two sentences are analyzed the same way,
as in the story.
Of course, all this is very unfair, and not at all surprising. The examples are out of
domain, so the language model doesn’t help us at all. So let’s try an in-domain example
of newswire text.
The following is almost the ﬁrst text I found by searching Arabic Web pages for
the Arabic for “Google Machine Translation,” simply because I had already read the
English reference document,3 and I was pretty sure it would be out there somewhere. It
is a human-authored Arabic translation of a recent Reuters story about the launching of
Google Language Tools, taken from Al Jazeera:4
Here is the SMT translation, delivered in about the time it would take a native speaker
to read the original:
The German Franz Ouch which leads efforts Google translation computer
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English, using documents of the United Nations and the European Union
key sources.
And how a new translation Ouch said that although the quality would not
be complete That was a good in the previous translation mechanism, and
that the correct translation mostly might be good enough for some tasks.
He stated that more data be fed by the results were better.
. . . He commended Miles Osborne Professor at the University of
Edinburgh, who died last year at work in the company’s efforts to Google,
but he pointed out that the software will not prevail over people skilled in
translations as they do in the game of chess and should use software to
understand and not to complete documents.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that this is really very good. It is quite clear what the story is,
and you can even guess that what Franz Och actually said in the English reference text
was: “The more data we feed into the system, the better it gets.” It even seems to know
that “Google” can be a verb.
However, it exhibits all the problems to which we have always known MT is heir.
Both pronouns “he” in the last paragraph will be understood as referring to Franz,
whereas in the reference text it is Miles Osborne who does the commending and the
pointing out. Moreover, the alarming rumor of the latter’s death has been greatly exag-
gerated by the English language-model: The reference text says he “spent a sabbatical
last year working on the Google project.” The human Arabic translation says much the
same, but the Arabic words for spent and died are homographs, and the newswire-based
model favors the latter.
And of course, our friends the Construction Grammarians will gleefully point out
that the systemmakes a hash of the unbounded dependency in Franz’s use of what they
call the “MORE-MORE” construction.
We can speciﬁcally probe the disability with respect to other kinds of unbound-




Comparing the examples that are translated correctly and those (labeled *) that are not,
the generalization is already clear: even a 5-gram model can only handle root subject
relative clauses. Object relatives are beyond the horizon. (These effects are robust under
variation of the content words.) Here are some more challenging embedded examples
that conﬁrm the diagnosis:
4. Who Cares?
What does this tell us? Nothing that we shouldn’t have already known. We knew that
n-gram models and FSTs weren’t going to handle long-range dependencies, because
Chomsky told us so. That’s one of the Big Truths of computational linguistics.
Our situation is in fact rather like that of the physicists. We have one theory for
talking about phenomena on a large scale, just as they have the General Theory of
Relativity, and another theory for talking about the very small scale, just as they have
Quantum Theory. Like the physicists, we have difﬁculty in reconciling those theoretical
levels. Like them, some of us think it’s ﬁne to have two theories, whereas others of us
think it’s intolerable.
The former kind of computational linguist will point out that long-range depen-
dencies are sparse. (There are around 20K *T* empty categories in around 16K of
the roughly 40K sentences in the Penn Treebank, of which around 6K seem to be
non-subject, non-sentential wh-traces of some kind.) Worrying about them isn’t going
to signiﬁcantly impact overall parser dependency recovery rates, much less n-gram-
precision-based BLEU scores. By the time we have fed enough data into the system
to make it know that spending a sabbatical at Google is more likely than dying there,
and Moore’s law has made the machines exponentially bigger and faster, and fancier
algorithms allow us to deal with bigger n-grams, maybe this problem will go away.
Maybe. These are certainly good reasons for the IR and SMT researchers to keep
working at the large scale, giving the world these amazing search engines and transla-
tion aids that give human beings vastly increased access to other cultures. This is our
discipline’s equivalent in street-credibility terms of delivering atomic energy and robots
on Mars.
Nevertheless, to the other kind of computational linguist, it sounds depressingly
like getting better and better at recalling what is already well-known, and understand-
ing what has often been said before.
They point out that, in the long run, ﬁnite statemethods alonemay simply not work.
Accuracy in most areas (WER in ASR, BLEU score in SMT, Eval-b for parsers) is at best
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linear in the logarithm of the amount of training data. Even optimistic extrapolation
of current learning curves suggests truly incredible amounts of data will be needed
(Lamel, Gauvain, and Adda 2002; Moore 2003; Knight and Koehn 2004; Brants et al.
2007).
Moreover, the more of the local stuff we get right, the more users will come to trust
the software, and hence the more noticeable long range dependencies will become, and
the more upset people will get if they are deceived by a wrong analysis.
What this should tell us is that the Long Tail is not mocked. Long-range depen-
dencies of the kind investigated above are semantically crucial. Ignoring them disrupts
all the other dependencies in those examples. (They are also more frequent in genres
like questions.) So we need to remember—and above all, teach our students—what our
discipline tells us the problem is, even when it’s not doing much for our BLEU score.
In this connection, it is encouraging to see that many of the MT papers in the 2007 ACL
explicitly invoked syntax-level representations.
But we need to do more than this. To get respect, and avoid the risk of yet another
AI/NLP Winter, we will need to pull ourselves together as a discipline, lift our eyes
above our rivalries, and take a longer view of where we are going (and where we have
come from) than seems to be the current style. This will probably require a gradual
move to a more considered and authoritative style of publication, with journal articles
taking the place of hastily written and reviewed conference papers, as another author
of this column recently suggested.
It will mean speaking with one voice, as the physicists and biologists do, and
supporting a diversity of views that transcends fashion and funding, wherever the
science is good. It also means telling the public in honest terms how to think about
what we do, what can be relied on and what the really hard problems are, in good times
and bad. This should not be too difﬁcult if we keep reminding them and ourselves of
the following:
Human knowledge is expressed in language. So computational linguistics is
very important.
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